

STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD P. CUERONI
COMMANDER, SEVENTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT

BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION,
JUSTICE, AND AGRICULTURE

MARCH 16, 1985

I. INTRODUCTION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD P. CUERONI, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD. I AM THE COMMANDER OF THE SEVENTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT WITH HEADQUARTERS HERE IN MIAMI, FLORIDA. I AM ALSO THE COORDINATOR OF THE SOUTHEAST REGION OF THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM AND THE HEAD OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SOUTHEAST FLORIDA TASK FORCE. IT'S MY PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY. I AM APPEARING SOLELY IN MY CAPACITY OF SEVENTH DISTRICT COMMANDER, AND WILL LIMIT MY REMARKS TO A DISCUSSION OF THE COAST GUARD'S INVOLVEMENT IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEAST U.S. AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN. MORE SPECIFICALLY, I WILL ADDRESS THE TOPICS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE COMMITTEE IN YOUR LETTER OF 19 FEBRUARY 1985 TO THE COMMANDANT CONCERNING THE MARITIME THREAT INTO THE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES, INTELLIGENCE FROM OVERSEAS SOURCES AND HOW THE MILITARY CAN BECOME MORE INVOLVED WITHIN LIMITS OF CURRENT LAWS.

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT, COVERING SOME 1.8 MILLION SQUARE MILES, 1600 MILES OF COASTLINE AND TWENTY-FOUR COUNTRIES, IS THE BUSIEST COAST GUARD DISTRICT IN TERMS OF SEARCH AND RESCUE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND INTERDICTION OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY THE EXACT AMOUNT OF CONTRABAND ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST U.S., INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF ILLICIT MARIJUANA AND COCAINE TRAFFIC, BY BOTH AIR AND SEA, PASSES THROUGH THE SEVENTH DISTRICT'S AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. OUR AIRCRAFT AND VESSELS, ASSISTED BY ADDITIONAL COAST GUARD RESOURCES FROM OTHER DISTRICTS ON THE GULF AND ATLANTIC COAST, ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO AIR AND SURFACE OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT AND DISRUPT MARITIME DRUG OPERATIONS. WE

HAVE IN PLACE A WIDE ARRAY OF ASSETS AND PERSONNEL TO PROSECUTE THESE PROGRAMS. THESE RANGE FROM SMALL COASTAL STATIONS OPERATING UTILITY BOATS TO MAJOR CUTTERS AND SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT WHICH RANGE FAR OFF SHORE.

II. THE MARITIME THREAT.

THE ENTRY POINT FOR MOST MARIJUANA AND COCAINE IS FLORIDA AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, OTHER LOCATIONS ALONG THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS. THIS MARITIME THREAT IS A REAL AND PRESENT DANGER TO THE HEALTH AND SECURITY OF THE NATION. THE PRIMARY POINTS OF ORIGIN FOR MARITIME TRAFFIC IN MARIJUANA AND COCAINE LIE ALONG THE NORTHERN COAST OF COLOMBIA, ESPECIALLY IN THE VICINITY OF THE GUAJIRA PENINSULA. THE ISLAND OF JAMAICA IS ALSO A SOURCE OF MARITIME MARIJUANA SMUGGLING. IN THE TYPICAL SCENARIO, BULK CARGOES OF MARIJUANA ARE LOADED INTO A WIDE VARIETY OF VESSELS, RANGING IN SIZE FROM SMALL FISHING VESSELS TO COASTAL AND OCEAN GOING FREIGHTERS. CARGO MAY BE LATER TRANSFERRED AT SEA TO SMALLER CONTACT VESSELS WHICH WILL CARRY THEM TO THEIR FINAL DESTINATION. WE CALL THE VESSELS WHICH CARRY THESE LARGE LOADS (AVERAGING ABOUT 12 TONS) FOR TRANSSHIPMENT TO CONTACT VESSELS, "MOTHERSHIPS". THESE LOADS EVENTUALLY ARRIVE OFF OUR SHORES WHERE THE TASK OF INTERCEPTING THEM IS COMPLICATED BY THE TREMENDOUS AREAS TO BE COVERED AND THEIR PROXIMITY TO THE COAST. WE WORK CLOSELY WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AS WELL AS STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES TO COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS IN THE COASTAL ZONE. WE ARE CONTINUALLY DEVELOPING PLANS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS AND HAVE RECENTLY CONDUCTED SEVERAL SUCH OPERATIONS.

THE ROUTE SELECTION OF THE MARITIME SMUGGLER IS LIMITED BY GEOGRAPHY TO A TRANSIT OF THE YUCATAN CHANNEL, THE WINDWARD PASSAGE, THE MONA PASSAGE OR THE

ANEGADA PASSAGES. A LIMITED NUMBER OF VESSELS ATTEMPT TO AVOID THESE "CHOKE POINTS" BY TRANSITING THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN FOR AN OFF-LOAD POINT ALONG THE MID-ATLANTIC OR NEW ENGLAND SEABOARDS. MANY VESSELS, INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE TRANSITING THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN, HEAD FOR THE BAHAMAS, FLORIDA OR THE GULF COAST. THE FOUR NATURAL "CHOKE POINTS" OF THE GREATER ANTILLES REPRESENT OUR MAIN LINE OF DEFENSE AND ARE AN IDEAL LOCATION FOR THE CONCENTRATION OF OUR SURFACE INTERDICTION CUTTERS. OUR STRATEGY IS BASED UPON MAXIMIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR AVAILABLE CUTTER RESOURCES BY INTERDICTING MOTHERSHIPS BEFORE THEY OFFLOAD TO CONTACT BOATS. BY INTERDICTING THE TYPICAL MOTHERSHIP, WE ELIMINATE THE MORE COMPLEX PROBLEM OF INTERDICTING ITS MANY CONTACT BOATS. SINCE IT IS IMPRACTICAL TO TOTALLY BLOCKADE THE MAJOR CHOKEPOINTS ON A CONTINUING BASIS TO DENY THEIR USE TO SMUGGLERS, WE HAVE OPTED FOR A MOBILE CONCEPT OF ROVING PATROLS INTO AND OUT OF THE CHOKEPOINTS TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR COVERAGE. WHILE MAINTAINING AS MUCH OF A PRESENCE AS IS OPERATIONALLY FEASIBLE IN THE CHOKEPOINTS, OUR CUTTERS ALSO PATROL THROUGHOUT THE BAHAMAS AND RANGE INTO THE SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN. OUR TACTICS ARE DESIGNED TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF THE CHOKEPOINTS WHILE KEEPING THE SMUGGLER OFF-BALANCE AND UNABLE TO ANTICIPATE OUR ACTIONS. WE STRIVE TO MAKE THE MARITIME SMUGGLER UNSURE OF HIS ENVIRONMENT AND VULNERABLE TO INTERDICTION THROUGHOUT HIS TRANSIT FROM ORIGIN TO DESTINATION. OUR RESOURCES MAY BE EMPLOYED SINGLY, IN SMALL GROUPS OR IN LARGE TASK UNITS.

AN INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT OF OUR OVERALL STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY FROM OUR PATROLLING CUTTERS IS THE AVAILABILITY OF AIR SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT. LONG AND MEDIUM RANGE FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, WITH THEIR ABILITY TO SEARCH LARGE AREAS, SUPPORT SURFACE UNITS BY DETECTING AND IDENTIFYING SUSPECT VESSELS AND MONITORING THEIR POSITION UNTIL A CUTTER CAN BE VECTORED TO THE

SCENE TO CONDUCT A BOARDING. OUR AIRCRAFT ROUTINELY FLY SURVEILLANCE MISSIONS IN THE STRAITS OF FLORIDA, ALONG THE BAHAMAS, IN THE VICINITY OF THE CHOKEPOINTS AND IN THE SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN. ALSO, THE USE OF HELICOPTERS ABOARD OUR PATROLLING CUTTERS RESULTS IN A MARKED INCREASE IN THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.

A RECENT EXAMPLE OF THE INCREASING SUCCESS OF OUR TACTICS IS OPERATION WAGONWHEEL WHICH SAW OUR FORCES AND THOSE OF THE NAVY MOVING THROUGH THE BAHAMAS AND CHOKEPOINTS AND INTO THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN CARIBBEAN TO THE VERY COAST OF THE GUAJIRA PENINSULA OF COLOMBIA. AS PART OF THE OVERALL JOINT INTER-AGENCY OPERATION "HAT TRICK" COORDINATED BY THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM (NNBIS), WAGONWHEEL SUCCESSFULLY BOTTLED UP MARITIME SMUGGLERS IN COLOMBIAN PORTS WHILE COLOMBIAN GROUND FORCES OPERATED THROUGHOUT THE MARIJUANA AND COCAINE GROWING, PROCESSING AND STORAGE AREAS MAKING HUNDREDS OF ARRESTS AND DESTROYING SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF MARIJUANA AND COCAINE AND PROCESSING EQUIPMENT. AS A RESULT OF THIS JOINT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORT, SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF COCAINE AND AS MUCH AS HALF OF THE FALL MARIJUANA HARVEST WAS DESTROYED, ACCORDING TO REPORTS PROVIDED BY COLOMBIAN OFFICIALS. THE SUCCESS OF THESE EFFORTS HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN A MORE THAN TWO-FOLD INCREASE IN THE STREET PRICE AND A MARKED DROP IN AVAILABILITY OF COLOMBIAN MARIJUANA THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE NOT SEEN A SIMILAR IMPACT ON THE PRICE AND AVAILABILITY OF COCAINE, ALTHOUGH PRICES ARE UP FROM A YEAR AGO.

A NEW ELEMENT OF THE MARITIME THREAT IS THE INCREASED SHIPMENT OF COCAINE BY VESSEL. THESE COMPACT HIGH VALUE SHIPMENTS ARE READILY CONCEALED ON A VESSEL AND EASILY DISPOSED OF AT SEA. AS WE APPROACH VESSELS ON THE HIGH

SEAS, WE FREQUENTLY OBSERVE WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE COCAINE BEING JETTISONED OVER THE SIDE. TO DATE THERE HAVE BEEN 5 CASES IN CY 1985, RESULTING IN THE SEIZURE OF 4 VESSELS AND 1,114 POUNDS OF COCAINE. COCAINE IS APPARENTLY BEING SHIPPED BY SEA IN INCREASING QUANTITIES. THE MARITIME SMUGGLING OF COCAINE TAKES PLACE ON A WIDE VARIETY OF VESSELS RANGING FROM MARIJUANA SMUGGLING FISHING BOATS TO CARGO CONTAINER SHIPS AND LARGE PASSENGER LINERS. THE COAST GUARD HAS INTERDICTED COCAINE CARGOES RANGING FROM ALMOST A TON CONCEALED IN A SAILBOAT TO OVER SIX HUNDRED POUNDS HIDDEN IN THE WATER TANK OF A FREIGHTER LOADED WITH YAMS. SMALLER QUANTITIES ARE PERIODICALLY SEIZED ON SMALL VESSELS TRANSITING TO THE FLORIDA COAST FROM THE BAHAMAS.

AS A RESULT OF OUR SUCCESS IN INTERDICTING VESSELS LADEN WITH LARGE CARGOES OF DRUGS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN THE CHOKEPOINTS, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE USE OF AIRCRAFT TO SMUGGLE SMALLER LOADS. SOMETIMES FLIGHTS COME DIRECTLY INTO THE UNITED STATES, BUT MORE FREQUENTLY THEY ARRIVE IN THE BAHAMAS FOR STORAGE PENDING A QUICK TRIP BY BOAT TO FLORIDA. THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS PRESENT IN THE BAHAMAS - A MYRIAD OF SMALL, FLAT, SPARSELY POPULATED ISLANDS, SURROUNDED BY A LARGE EXPANSE OF SHALLOW WATER, LOCATED ONLY HOURS BY FAST BOAT AND MINUTES BY AIRCRAFT FROM THE UNITED STATES - MAKE THEM AN IDEAL STAGING AREA FOR SUCH SMUGGLING OPERATIONS AND MAKE THE SMUGGLING SITUATION IN SOUTH FLORIDA ESPECIALLY ACUTE. I AM HEARTENED BY THE FACT THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAS RECENTLY MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS AND DISCUSSED WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO RESOLVE THIS SITUATION.

ANOTHER FACTOR TO DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT IS THE NEED TO PROVIDE RESOURCES TO INTERDICT THE FLOW OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS INTO THE U.S. THESE ARE PRINCIPALLY HAITIANS COMING DIRECTLY FROM HAITI, AND A VARIETY OF NATIONALITIES - INCLUDING HAITIANS - COMING FROM THE BAHAMAS INTO THE UNITED STATES. IN TYPICAL COAST GUARD MULTI-MISSION FASHION, OUR PATROLLING CUTTERS ENGAGE IN BOTH ANTI-SMUGGLING AND ANTI-ILLEGAL MIGRANT ACTIVITIES. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS MULTI-MISSION PERFORMANCE IS OUR CONTINUAL PRESENCE IN THE WINDWARD PASSAGE FOR THE INTERDICTION OF HAITIAN MIGRANTS WHICH HAS ALSO HAD A HIGHLY BENEFICIAL IMPACT ON REDUCING THE FLOW OF DRUG CARRYING VESSELS THROUGH THAT CHOKEPOINT.

IN MANY WAYS, CALENDAR YEAR 1984 WAS A GOOD LAW ENFORCEMENT YEAR FOR MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE SEVENTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT. UNITS OPERATING UNDER THE SEVENTH DISTRICT SEIZED 197 VESSELS, ARRESTED 813 PERSONS ONBOARD, AND INTERDICTED NEARLY 2.2 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA. OTHER DRUG SEIZURES INCLUDED 1926 POUNDS OF COCAINE AND 3 POUNDS OF HEROIN. THIS WAS THE BEST YEAR EVER IN TERMS OF VESSELS SEIZED AND COMPARES FAVORABLY WITH 1.7 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA INTERDICTED AND 155 VESSEL SEIZURES IN 1983, AND 2.4 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA INTERDICTED AND 145 VESSELS SEIZED IN 1982. THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE CASES OF COAST GUARD ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, ON THE SUBJECT OF NUMBERS, I WANT TO TAKE SOME TIME TO DISCUSS THE MEASUREMENT OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS BECAUSE IT APPEARS TO BE WIDELY MISUNDERSTOOD. FRANKLY, I KNOW OF NO SIMPLE MEASUREMENT WHICH CAN PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY UNDERSTANDING OF THIS COMPLEX PROBLEM. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO QUANTITATIVELY MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE LAW ENFORCEMENT

OPERATIONS. THIS PROBLEM IS ESPECIALLY ACUTE FOR THE MARITIME SMUGGLING PROBLEM. WE SUFFER FROM A LACK OF ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE FULL GAMUT OF CRITICAL DATA, E.G., THE EXACT QUANTITIES OF MARIJUANA BEING PRODUCED IN THE SOURCE NATIONS, HOW MUCH IS HARVESTED, CONSUMED IN COUNTRY, ROTS IN STORAGE, OR IS EXPORTED TO COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE U.S. ALSO UNKNOWN ARE THE NUMBERS OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN THE TRANSPORT OF MARIJUANA AND COCAINE, THE ROUTES WHICH THEY TAKE, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, INTERDICTION, AND DETERRANCE IN AN EVER CHANGING OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER SIMILAR ESSENTIAL PARAMETERS OF THE PROBLEM. I AM CONTINUALLY ASKED TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR OPERATIONS. I HAVE CONTINUALLY RESISTED THE TEMPTATION TO DO SO. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT WE ARE MORE EFFECTIVE TODAY THAN WE WERE YESTERDAY. I KNOW THAT WE WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE TOMORROW. THERE ARE SIMPLY NO EASY ANSWERS TO QUANTIFY EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE, I HAVE ONE STAFF STUDY THAT SHOWS THAT FOR EVERY DOLLAR INVESTED IN THE DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS OF MAJOR CUTTERS IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT IN 1984, SIXTEEN DOLLARS WORTH OF DANGEROUS DRUGS WERE KEPT OFF THE STREET. WHILE THIS NUMBER MAY BE COMFORTING, IT IS NOT ESPECIALLY RELEVANT, FOR IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LARGE SHIPMENTS OF DRUGS WHICH WE KNOW FROM INTELLIGENCE WERE JETTISONED OR OTHERWISE DETERRED BY OUR ENFORCEMENT PRESENCE. NOR DOES IT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE COSTS OF SUPPORT OF ALL TYPES FOR THESE CUTTER OPERATIONS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, WE DO NOT HAVE ACCURATE FIGURES ON THE QUANTITY OF DRUGS WHICH REACH OUR SHORES AND ARE CONSUMED. A MORE MEANINGFUL, BUT DIFFICULT TO QUANTIFY, INDICATOR OF OUR EFFECTIVENESS IS FOUND IN QUALITATIVE INDICATIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS, E.G., EXTENSIVE ROUTE CHANGES SUCH AS A SHIP OFFLOADING ITS CARGO TO A TRUCK FOR OVERLAND SHIPMENT TO BYPASS A CHOKEPOINT BEFORE BEING LOADED ONTO ANOTHER VESSEL, SOPHISTICATED HIDDEN COMPARTMENTS INCLUDING EXTERIOR ATTACHMENTS, THE SHIFT TO MORE AIR TRANSPORT, EXTENSIVE COUNTER-

SURVEILLANCE AGAINST COAST GUARD UNITS, CHANGES IN THE TYPES OF VESSELS USED BY THE SMUGGLERS. THESE ARE ALL SIGNS THAT OUR OPERATIONS ARE IMPACTING ON MARITIME SMUGGLING.

TO MEET THE MARITIME THREAT, DURING THE NEXT YEAR OUR FLEET OF CUTTERS WILL CONTINUE TO BE RENOVATED AND MODERNIZED. THE NEW 270 FOOT MEDIUM ENDURANCE CLASS CUTTERS EQUIPPED WITH HELICOPTER FLIGHT DECKS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO TAKE THEIR PLACE IN OUR PATROL AREAS. WE WILL BEGIN TAKING DELIVERY ON THE FIRST OF EIGHT NEW AND VERY CAPABLE HIGH SPEED PATROL BOATS. WE WILL RECEIVE THE FIRST AIREYE SENSOR PACKAGE WHICH WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY OF OUR NEW HU-25 FALCON JET IN BOTH DAYLIGHT AND DARKNESS. OUR NEW HH-65 DOLPHIN HELICOPTERS WILL BEGIN TO ARRIVE AND REPLACE OUR CURRENT HH-52 HELICOPTERS. THESE HELICOPTERS ARE ALSO SHIP DEPLOYABLE AND ARE FASTER AND MORE CAPABLE THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS. WITH THEIR MODERN SENSOR SYSTEMS, EVENTUALLY INCLUDING FORWARD LOOKING INFRA-RED (FLIR), THEY WILL MARKEDLY IMPROVE THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR SHIP/HELO INTERDICTION TEAMS.

WE HAVE COMPLETED EVALUATION OF A NEW MOBILE MARITIME RADAR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM CALLED AEROSTAT WHICH EMPLOYS A RADAR MOUNTED ON A BALLOON WHICH IS TETHERED TO A SHIP. THIS SYSTEM HAS PROVED TO BE A SIGNIFICANT ASSET TO INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE "CHOKE POINTS" AND HAS THE ABILITY TO DETECT AND TRACK VESSELS AS FAR AS SEVENTY MILES AWAY AND TO VECTOR A PATROLLING CUTTER TO AN INTERCEPT. THE FIRST SYSTEM SUFFERED CRASH DAMAGE AND IS NO LONGER OPERATIONAL, BUT SHORTLY A REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WILL BE PLACED IN SERVICE. WE HAVE PLANS TO PROCURE A NUMBER OF THESE AEROSTAT SYSTEMS FOR USE IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AND THE BAHAMAS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

III. THE AIR THREAT

AS COMMANDER OF THE SEVENTH COAST GUARD DISTRICT, I HAVE NO DIRECT COMMENT ON THE AIR INTERDICTION PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT CUSTOMS AIR SURVEILLANCE RESOURCES ARE ROUTINELY IN CONTACT WITH OUR VESSELS ON PATROL. THE SAME IS TRUE OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AIRCRAFT. THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE AIR SMUGGLING THREAT WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT MY MARITIME OPERATIONS. THE INTERFACE FOR MOST AIRDROPS TAKES PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS PATROLLED BY COAST GUARD CUTTERS. MOREOVER, THE ROUTES WHICH THESE AIRCRAFT TAKE FROM THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ARE OFTEN THE SAME AS THE MARITIME ROUTES, INCLUDING USE OF THE SAME CHOKEPOINTS. THE COAST GUARD, AS I PREVIOUSLY STATED, HAS POSITIONED ITS AIR AND SURFACE RESOURCES IN THESE STRATEGIC LOCATIONS. THE COAST GUARD ROUTINELY CONDUCTS ANTI-MARITIME SMUGGLING PATROLS IN AREAS THAT IDEALLY PLACE OUR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT TO MONITOR AIR TRAFFIC TO AND FROM COLOMBIA, HAITI AND JAMAICA AS WELL AS BETWEEN THE BAHAMAS AND THE COAST OF FLORIDA. COAST GUARD CUTTERS AND AIRCRAFT, THEREFORE, ARE FREQUENTLY WELL POSITIONED TO DETECT SIMULTANEOUSLY BOTH AIR AND SEA DRUG SMUGGLERS. COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT HAVE, ON OCCASION, SIGHTED SUSPICIOUS AIRCRAFT AND HAVE FOLLOWED THEM UNTIL CUSTOMS WAS ABLE TO GET AN AIRCRAFT ON SCENE AND CONTINUE THE PURSUIT. THE SEA-BASED LEASED AEROSTAT SYSTEM IN USE TO DATE ONLY HAS A SURFACE SEARCH RADAR WITH NO AIR SEARCH CAPABILITY.

IV. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

RECENT EVENTS INDICATE OUR PAST RECORD OF GOOD COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT ONLY CONTINUE BUT THAT WE WILL SEE EVEN MORE JOINT

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE OPERATIONS AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE TO STEM THE FLOW OF ILLICIT DRUGS THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN. THROUGH OUR WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN REGION IN ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF SEARCH AND RESCUE, WE HAVE CREATED MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION IN THE DRUG INTERDICTION AREA. RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH HIGH OFFICIALS OF SEVERAL CARIBBEAN NATIONS INDICATE THEIR HEIGHTENED CONCERN ABOUT DRUG USE AND ITS CORRUPTING EFFECT ON THEIR COUNTRIES AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH US. WE WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND DEA IN SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THESE OPPORTUNITIES.

MR CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THIS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORT WILL ALLOW US TO ERADICATE MORE DRUGS IN SOURCE COUNTRIES AND INTERDICT SHIPMENTS IN THE TRANS-SHIPMENT AREAS. IN MY OPINION, THESE EFFORTS HOLD GREAT PROMISE TO DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE EQUATION. MEXICO HAS RECENTLY INCREASED PATROLS OFF HER COASTAL WATERS AND RESPONDED TO SEVERAL COAST GUARD REQUESTS TO INTERCEPT FLEEING DRUG VESSELS WHICH WE WERE PURSUING. THIS ACTION RESULTED IN THE SEIZURE OF THREE VESSELS WITH OVER 32 TONS OF MARIJUANA BY THE MEXICAN AUTHORITIES. RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MEXICAN NAVY HAVE RESULTED IN A GREAT DEAL OF VERY VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE AND INDICATE A WILLINGNESS ON THEIR PART TO ENGAGE IN JOINT COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE.

BOTH JAMAICA AND THE BAHAMAS HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN SHARING INTELLIGENCE AS WELL AS RENEWING JOINT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL TO THE SUPPRESSION OF MARITIME DRUG SMUGGLING.

OPERATION WAGONWHEEL WAS AN UNPRECEDENTED EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATIVE EFFORTS. IN ADDITION TO SUPPORT BY FORCES FROM VENEZUELA AND THE NETHERLANDS, EXTENSIVE JOINT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITH THE COLOMBIAN NAVY WHICH INCLUDED THE EXCHANGE OF LIAISON OFFICERS, LOGISTICS AND INTELLIGENCE. COAST GUARD PARTICIPANTS IN THESE OPERATIONS RETURNED FULL OF PRAISE AND ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROFESSIONALISM AND CAPABILITIES OF THE COLOMBIAN NAVY AND PROSPECTS LOOK BRIGHT FOR ADDITIONAL OPERATIONS OF THIS SORT IN THE FUTURE.

OUR PRIMARY SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE COMES FROM INTERNAL COAST GUARD SOURCES, THE EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER (EPIC) AND THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM (NNBIS). THESE SOURCES ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON FOREIGN COLLECTION EFFORTS BY DEA AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE INFORMATION WE RECEIVE IS OF EXCELLENT QUALITY. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE SUCCESSES PREVIOUSLY LISTED FOR 1984 ARE IN LARGE MEASURE DUE TO AN IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE INPUT TO OUR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS.

V. DOD MILITARY COOPERATION

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION FOR DOD ASSETS TO SUPPORT COAST GUARD INTERDICTION OPERATIONS HAS BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN CLARIFYING THE LINES OF AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. DOD RESOURCES, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINES, HAVE BEEN PLAYING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION MISSION BY PROVIDING SURVEILLANCE AND SUPPORT. USAF AND USN LONG RANGE SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT ALSO SEARCH FOR SMUGGLERS. U.S. NAVY VESSELS ROUTINELY DEPLOY WITH COAST GUARD BOARDING TEAMS ABOARD. OPERATION WAGONWHEEL WAS A PARTICULARLY GOOD EXAMPLE OF INCREASED USE OF DOD ASSETS. DOD COOPERATION WAS EXCELLENT. THERE WAS A LARGE SCALE COMMITMENT OF DOD RESOURCES DEDICATED SOLELY TO THE SUPPORT OF COAST GUARD OPERATIONS. THE NAVY

PROVIDED TWO LARGE SURFACE VESSELS, FOUR PATROL HYDROFOILS AND A SQUADRON OF P-3 AIRCRAFT DEDICATED TO THE COAST GUARD OPERATION FOR A MONTH. THE COAST GUARD RECEIVED LOGISTICS SUPPORT FROM THE NAVAL BASES AT GUANTANAMO BAY CUBA, AND ROOSEVELT ROADS, PUERTO RICO. COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION AND OTHER SUPPORT WAS RECEIVED FROM THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND IN PANAMA.

COAST GUARD PERSONNEL HAVE CONDUCTED MANY BOARDINGS FROM NAVY VESSELS. THESE HAVE RESULTED IN THE SEIZURE OF 5 VESSELS, THE ARREST OF 41 PERSONS, AND THE INTERDICTION OF 176,000 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA. AS EXCELLENT AS THIS RECORD IS, WE SEEK TO IMPROVE IT. WITH EVERY NAVAL VESSEL IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN BEING A POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR A COAST GUARD BOARDING, THE SMUGGLERS' PROBLEMS WOULD BE COMPOUNDED CONSIDERABLY.

VI. CONCLUSION.

IN SUMMARY, WHILE I AM PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS WHICH WE HAVE MADE IN COMBATTING MARITIME SMUGGLING- - -I AM ALSO FRUSTRATED - FRUSTRATED BECAUSE WHILE WE ARE WORKING HARDER AND SMARTER, THERE ARE STILL FAR TOO MANY DRUGS ON THE STREET. I AM, HOWEVER, OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF OUR PLANS AND OUR ABILITY TO DO EVEN BETTER IN THE FUTURE AS EXISTING ASSETS ARE RENOVATED AND NEW ONES COMMISSIONED. MULTI-AGENCY COOPERATIVE EFFORTS INFLICT DAMAGE UPON THE SMUGGLERS. AN EXPANSION OF SUCH EFFORTS COUPLED WITH INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS AND DYNAMIC COORDINATION BY NNBIS WILL SEE US MAKING EVEN MORE HEADWAY AGAINST THE FLOW OF ILLICIT NARCOTICS. THE COAST GUARD WILL CONTINUE TO PATROL THE BAHAMAS, THE CHOKEPOINTS AND RANGE INTO THE SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN. WE WILL ALSO PLACE NEW EMPHASIS ON INTERDICTING MARITIME SMUGGLING IN THE COASTAL ARRIVAL ZONES ESPECIALLY ALONG THE FLORIDA COAST.

PLANS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY FOR ANOTHER SERIES OF LARGE SCALE, MULTI-UNIT COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WHICH WILL INVOLVE BOTH INTER-AGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL JOINT OPERATIONS.

THIS CONCLUDES MY PREPARED TESTIMONY, MR CHAIRMAN. I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU OR THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE.